Interim Report on Fukushima Accident released

A government panel on Fukushima disaster investigation released an interim report yesterday in Japan. A growing conviction in Japan that I observed in my three visits since last April is that this nuclear disaster was rather man-made disaster rather than subsequent failure caused by the earthquake and tsunami. Disaster warnings in previous years had been ignored, regulatory systems had not been strictly observed, and finally evacuation was poorly managed when the disaster did happen. In short, it is a man-made disaster affecting all aspects of society in Japan, sociopolitical and economic life, and spiritually.


I browsed a couple of prominent Japanese newspapers and provide a few highlights below:

Mainichi Japan has the gist of the interim report including the following notes on December 26, 2011.

The government:
-- failed to communicate well within the prime minister's office.
-- had problems gathering information through channels stipulated in the nuclear disaster response manual.
-- did not use in issuing evacuation orders data from a computer system to predict the dispersal of released radioactive materials.
-- failed to fully use a facility planned to serve as the local headquarters as it was unprepared for a rise in radiation levels.

TEPCO:
-- misunderstood the functioning status of the No. 1 reactor's cooling system called the isolation condenser.
-- had not trained reactor operators sufficiently to handle the isolation condenser.
-- mishandled the No. 3 reactor's emergency cooling system.
-- might have been able to lessen the damage of fuel inside the Nos. 1 and 3 reactors if it acted more appropriately.

The investigation committee:
-- calls for the need to be prepared for low-probability events if the possible consequences could cause extremely huge damage.
-- calls for the need to consider the possibility that a nuclear accident can occur in combination with natural disasters.
-- believes that people involved in considering the country's nuclear disaster measures lacked a broader perspective on the issue.
-- has so far not confirmed that reactor vessels were damaged by the March 11 earthquake, before being hit by ensuing tsunami waves.

In Asahi Shimbun several articles are available including the viewpoints of the panelists as below:

"There are many important weak points in the safety of Japan's nuclear plants so it is implausible that everything would be all right as long as tsunami measures were implemented," said Yoshioka, whose specialty is the history of science. "I feel this is the common understanding of panel members."

The following preliminary conclusions were given at the end of the panel's interim report : 

* Preliminary conclusions
(1) TEPCO did not implement measures based on an assumption of a severe accident caused by tsunami as was the case with this accident. The same thing can be said about the regulatory agencies.
(2) For events in which an extremely large scale of damage is forecast, even if the evaluation is made that the probability of such events is low, there is a need to recognize the risk and implement necessary measures.
(3) Measures to deal with multiple disasters considered unlikely will be an important point in the future review of the safety of nuclear power plants.
(4) There is no denying the weakness in a perspective that took into consideration a much larger picture. The excuse that responses could not be made because of the special nature of the situation, in which a tsunami went beyond expectations, will be unacceptable.
From the above points, there will be a need for a conversion of the framework for the fundamental thinking related to anti-disaster measures for gigantic systems that could lead to serious damage.

Due to the poor communication (in fact hiding of the information) and poor control of evacuation of  local residents out of the 20KM zone, the level of radiation exposure became
higher than necessary (See the map below and read the full article).

In my first trip to Fukushima in early April, my Japanese team and I, through our many listening meetings at local churches, discovered the most critical piece of information for local residents in Fukushima was radiation readings - as accurately as possible we could provide. Se we did (read the entry I wrote that time, Radiation: Fear, Fact and Faith). But more importantly we were convinced through prayers and listening that appropriate action in such a multifaceted disaster like this one must be based not simply on factual information, which wasn't readily available any way, but on wisdom and in community of people who were committed to stay with local people in the long run (read the entry I wrote in my second trip to Fukushima, Radiation: From Fear to Action). And that is the local church.  

Where will hope for rebuilding the future come from for Fukushima and for the whole society in Japan?

Man-made disaster affecting all of Japanese (and our!) society needs wholistic solutions that will bring total transformation of society coming from the changed core of our being and from transformed ways of our action and existence in the world. It will not come from simply providing more efforts to improve science and technology to control energy systems. It will not come from another election that will bring a new set of political leaders to the same systems. It will not come from pouring more money to lend to TEPCO so they could continue their business as usual.